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HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY
Major Developments at the 1989
Session of the UN Commission on
Human Rights
Reed Brody and David Weissbrodt*
On 10 March 1989 the United Nations Commission on Human Rights con-
cluded its six week session in Geneva with a number of significant decisions
as to country situations in which human rights violations have occurred,
including the establishment of a Special Rapporteur on Romania. The Com-
mission also continued monitoring disappearances, torture, executions, re-
ligious intolerance, and mercenaries; approved a draft Convention on the
Rights of the Child after nine years of discussion; promptly transmitted to
the General Assembly a draft Second Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights for the abolition of the death penalty;
reaffirmed the right of conscientious objection to military service; renewed
emphasis on the provision of advisory services to assist governments in
protecting the rights of their citizens; and acted on a number of other matters.'
The Commission session was marred, however, by the failure to take
any action on human rights abuses in Iraq or even to discuss human rights
in Africa (outside of Southern Africa). The Commission also refused to seek
greater scrutiny of the human rights situation in Cuba, despite strenuous
lobbying by the United States delegation.
ORGANIZATION AND CONDUCT OF THE COMMISSION SESSION
At its first meeting on 30 January 1989 the forty-three member governments
of the Commission elected Marc Bossuyt of Belgium as Chair for the 45th
* This article is adapted from one which appeared in IC] Review 42 (June 1989).
1. See Quaker United Nations Office-Geneva, United Nations Commission on Human Rights,
45th Session, 30 Jan. to 10 Mar. 1989 (1989); see generally Howard Tolley, Jr., The U.N.
Commission on Human Rights (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987).
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session, pursuant to the five year rotational system which this year called
for a chair from the "Western European and Other" group of countries.2 The
Commission also elected Christy Ezim Mbonu (Nigeria) as its Rapporteur
and the three other members of its Bureau: Claude Heller (Mexico), Quian
Jiadong (China), and Zagora Ilic (Yugoslavia) as vice-presidents. The election
of Mr. Quian broke a long-standing tradition that representatives of the
permanent members of the UN Security Council would not sit on the bureau
of the Human Rights Commission or other functional commissions of the
UN Economic and Social Council; his election fueled speculation that China
would seek to become Chair at next year's Commission session.
The Commission heard speeches from an unusually large number of
cabinet officials, which continued a trend from the past two sessions and
which made the Commission appear less like a specialized human rights
body and more like the General Assembly. The cabinet officials, who spoke
at the 1989 session, included Michel Rocard, Prime Minister of France;
Dante Caputo, Foreign Minister of Argentina and President of the UN General
Assembly; F. Fernandez Ordonoz, Foreign Minister of Spain, who spoke as
chairman of the European Community Council of Ministers; the Vice-Pres-
ident of Afghanistan; and the Foreign Ministers of the Holy See and Sweden.
Rocard was eloquent in his praise for nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs): "When states keep silent, the NGOs speak. When governments
are powerless, NGOs act, unfettered by reasons of state. That is when the
oppressors hesitate, the oppressed resist and the excluded regain hope." 3
COUNTRY SITUATIONS
The Commission on Human Rights took action on a variety of country
situations and received significant information about human rights abuses
in an even wider group of nations, but experienced increasing difficulty in
taking action on some countries which received political support from
strengthened regional blocs. The Commission adopted resolutions, discussed
below, on Afghanistan, Albania, Burma, Chile, Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Haiti, Iran, Israeli-occupied territories, Southern Lebanon, Romania, and
South Africa. The Commission also adopted resolutions on Equitorial Guinea,
Kampuchea, Namibia, and Western Sahara. In addition, the Commission
continued its scrutiny of Brunei, Haiti, Paraguay, and Somalia, under the
confidential procedure authorized by Economic and Social Council Reso-
2. The Western European and Other Group of countries in the Commission includes Belgium,
Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United
Kingdom, and the United States.
3. M. Rocard, Speech to UN Commission on Human Rights, 6 Feb. 1989, at 4.
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lution 1503. 4 The Commission failed to take action on Iraq either in public
session or under the confidential "1503" procedure and also discontinued
its consideration under "1503" of Honduras, Syria, and Zaire.5 Once again
the Commission postponed any decision on the situation in a divided Cyprus.
A far broader group of countries were the subject of scrutiny by the Com-
mission under the thematic procedures discussed below.
Action on country situations at the Commission has become increasingly
difficult with the strengthening of regional blocs which are able to prevent
or control measures sought to be taken against one of the region's govern-
ments. This problem has long undermined Commission initiatives in Africa
(outside of Southern Africa) and has recently become evident in Latin America
where the "Group of 8"6 now effectively determines the limits of resolutions
on Chile, El Salvador, and Guatemala. According to several Latin diplomats,
this trend towards regionalization was accelerated by the US campaign
against Cuba which, in the words of one, "made us realize that this is a
political forum, not a human rights forum, and we had to develop a political
response." The Asian group in the Commission had long been divided by
a great diversity of economic systems, cultures, languages, and forms of
government represented in that continent. Nevertheless, the Asian group
coalesced at the 1989 session of the Commission to limit substantially a
French initiative on Burma. In contrast, the Commission's resolution on
Romania was made possible because Bulgaria, the German Democratic
Republic, the Ukrainian SSR, and the USSR decided not to participate in
that vote.
Afghanistan
The Commission received a brief report on the human rights situation in
Afghanistan from its Special Rapporteur, who had received cooperation from
the Afghan authorities and had been permitted to visit the country. The
Commission, without a vote, adopted a resolution welcoming the cooper-
ation of the Afghan authorities and urging all parties concerned to work for
a comprehensive political solution based on the right of self-determination.
Following its approach at the 1988 General Assembly, the USSR joined the
consensus on the resolution rather than forcing a vote which would have
been overwhelming. The Commission urged all parties to the conflict to
release all prisoners of war in accordance with humanitarian law and to do
4. E.S.C. Res. 1503, 48 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 1A) at 8, U.N. Doc. E/4832/Add. 1 (1970).
5. It appears, however, that Zaire will report on its human rights situation in a closed meeting
during the 1990 session of the Commission.
6. The "Group of 8" comprise the eight Latin American members of the Commission: Ar-
gentina, Brazil, Columbia, Cuba, Mexico, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela.
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everything possible to facilitate the safe return of refugees and displaced
persons in safety. It called again upon the Afghan authorities to investigate
the fate of disappeared persons.
Albania
Last year the Commission decided to transfer its consideration of Albania
from the confidential 1503 procedure to a public consideration under agenda
item 12 (the "Question of the violation of human rights and fundamental
freedoms in any part of the world . . .- ).7 In 1988 the Commission also
recommended to the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) the release
of all records about Albania which accumulated under the 1503 procedure
over a five year period during which that government had refused to respond.
By a close vote ECOSOC, however, rejected the recommendation to make
public the 1503 materials on Albania. Hence, despite last year's decision,
there was no reference to Albania in the agenda of the 1989 session. The
Commission did receive a resolution on Albania from its Sub-Commission
on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. On a Portu-
guese initiative, the Commission adopted (by a vote of thirty-three in favor,
three against, and thirteen abstentions) a resolution regretting that the ex-
haustive efforts to solicit the cooperation of Albania under the 1503 pro-
cedure had been in vain and also that the government had failed for the
second consecutive year to respond to allegations submitted by the Special
Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance. The Commission called upon the gov-
ernment to provide information on the concrete manner in which its con-
stitutional and legal measures complied with the provisions of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and to respond to the allegations transmitted
by the Special Rapporteur. The Commission's consideration of the situation
in Albania was handicapped by the lack of timely and adequate information
about conditions in the country.
Burma
The Commission also was handicapped by insufficient information about
the current human rights situation in Burma. The French delegation proposed
a draft resolution which sought the appointment of a Special Rapporteur to
assess the situation. The French proposal met with strong resistance from
the Asian delegates. After long negotiations, the Commission without a vote
adopted a compromise decision, submitted by the Chair, expressing "concern
7. C.H.R. Res. 1988/17, ESCOR Supp. (No. 2) at 66, U.N. Doc. ECN.4/1988/88 (1988).
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... at the reports and allegations of violations of human rights in Burma in
1988 , and encouraged the Burmese authorities to fulfill their promises of
holding elections.
Chile
Once again the Commission expressed its concern at the persistence of
serious violations of human rights in Chile, as described in the comprehensive
report of the Special Rapporteur, which referred to cases of murder, abduc-
tion, disappearances, torture, arbitrary arrest, prolonged periods of incom-
municado detention, political prisoners, death threats, and the intimidation
of opponents of the government. Despite the abstention of Japan, the United
States, and eight developing countries, the Commission again urged the
government to put an end to these human rights abuses and to continue
adopting measures to permit the restoration of the rule of law in Chile and
the full enjoyment of human rights.
Cuba
The most politically-charged debate at the 1989 session arose over the
attempt by the United States to continue the Commission's intensive scrutiny
of the human rights situation in Cuba. At its 1988 session the Commission
had accepted an invitation from the government of Cuba for a delegation
of six Commission members to visit that country and "prepare a report to
be submitted for consideration by the Commission, which would decide on
the manner in which the report was to be examined." 9
The Commission's delegation included the chair of the 1988 session,
Alioune Sene of Senegal, as well as J. S. Attah (Nigeria), Todor Dichev
(Bulgaria), Jose Ingles (Philippines), Michael Lillis (Ireland), and Rafael Rivas
Posada (Colombia). The group had initially scheduled a visit of five days,
which was extended to ten days in September 1988, during which it met
with government officials, NGOs, and private individuals. The group also
visited prisons (and met in private with prisoners), schools, hospitals, and
other facilities. The Cuban government publicized the trip and published
the telephone numbers at which the group could be contacted, with the
result that the group received over 1,600 complaints alleging human rights
violations.
8. C.H.R. Res. 1989/11, U.N. Docs. E/CN.4/1989/L.1 1/Add. 10, at 3 (1989); E/CN.4/1989/
L.1 0/Add. 12, at 11 (1989).
9. See Weissbrodt, Country Related and Thematic Developments at the 1988 Session of the
UN Commission on Human Rights, 10 Hum. Rts. Q. 544, 550-58 (Nov. 1988).
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When the Commission began its 1989 session, the carefully negotiated
report had not yet been completed. Since the 1988 Commission had failed
to decide how (or even whether) the report would be considered by the
1989 session of the Commission, it was feared that a procedural struggle
might erupt over the agenda on the very first day of the 1989 session. The
United States made clear, as it had last year, that it wanted the discussion
to take place under agenda item twelve (violation of human rights and
fundamental freedoms). The Cuban delegation and their Latin American
allies were equally insistent that Cuba could not be compared to other
countries on the Commission's agenda under item twelve, such as Afghan-
istan, El Salvador, and Iran; they proposed discussing the report under item
11 (further promotion and encouragement of human rights and fundamental
freedoms). Negotiations were undertaken by Michael Lillis (Ireland) and
Mercedes Rico (Spain), for the Western European and Other group, on the
one hand, and by Claude Heller (Mexico), Rafael Rivas Posada (Colombia),
and Manuel Rodriguez (Peru), for the Latin "Group of 8," on the other. The
compromise solution was to deal with the report under a separate, special
item eleven bis, sparing Cuba from item twelve treatment, but permitting a
full debate by Commission members and observers.
The report itself, finally released at the end of the Commission's third
week, provided an extremely interesting picture of conditions in Cuba.10
The document issued by the group which visited Cuba ran 400 pages and
was apparently the largest human rights report ever produced under United
Nations auspices. The document, however, contained only fifty-five pages
of actual text in which the group summarized the allegations of human rights
violations received by the group and the government's responses. The re-
mainder of the document comprised a series of annexes mostly containing
allegations of human rights violations. One annex listed by category 1,600
complaints received by the group of which 1,183 concerned the right to
leave the country or to return. Another annex reproduced the questions on
the Cuban constitutional and legal system prepared by Ambassador Lillis on
behalf of the group. Several annexes reproduced articles and allegations by
opponents of the Cuban government. The document also included tables
showing the gains in the enjoyment of economic, social, and cultural rights
which have occurred since the Cuban revolution of 1961.
The report was remarkable in that it was adopted by consensus of all
six Commission members from different parts of the world, including the
Bulgarian member representing the Eastern European countries. Evidently,
the consensus nature of the report made it impossible for the group to reach
any conclusions, because the report lacked both factual findings and recom-
mendations. A careful reading of the allegations of human rights violations
10. U.N. Doc. EICN.4/1989/46 (1989).
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and the government's responses did indicate recent improvements in that a
number of prisoners had been released, prison conditions had improved,
and complaints of ill-treatment of prisoners had diminished. The principal
remaining problems dealt with the right of Cubans to leave their country or
return. Cuba did not respond to many of the individual allegations mentioned
in the document and the group was not able to study these cases.
The United States in 1988 had contended that there were 10,000 to
15,000 political prisoners in Cuba, extrajudicial executions, and disap-
pearances. The report did not substantiate these allegations, although they
were repeated less stridently by the US delegation to the 1989 Commission
session. Most disturbing, however, were reports that the Cuban government
had retaliated against some individuals who gave evidence to the group or
sought to do so. The US delegation left no doubt that its highest, if not sole,
priority for the 1989 Commission was achieving a condemnation of Cuba,
but the delegation did not repeatedly present public statements throughout
the session, as occurred in 1988. US lobbying, while reportedly as intense
as in 1988 in the capitals of the voting members of the Commission, was
somewhat less visible in the Commission and its corridors. While Cuba
remained largely a US concern as in 1987 and 1988, this year several other
countries joined the US initiative, including Morocco, the Netherlands, and
the United Kingdom.
The United States had four concrete objectives regarding Cuba at the
1989 Commission:
(1) to continue the mandate of the group of six who visited Cuba;
(2) to ask the group of six to continue to observe the human rights
situation in Cuba pursuant to agenda item twelve (violation of human rights);
(3) to ask the group to investigate the individual allegations which had
been presented to the group and the allegations of retaliation against some
witnesses or prospective witnesses; and
(4) to encourage the Cuban government to accept a second visit.
These objectives were embodied in a draft which the US delegation
circulated informally. One of the principal arguments in favor of the US
position was that the Cuban government had not received an opportunity
to respond fully to the group's report, which had just been produced, and
thus the group needed to continue its consideration of the information it
had received and the Cuban response.
The Cuban government sought to remove this argument by presenting
a lengthy oral response to the report during the discussion under agenda
item eleven bis. Cuban Ambassador, Raul Roa Kouri, spent almost ninety
minutes providing his government's answers to allegations contained in the
report. Debate on the report then generally followed geopolitical lines. The
Western European delegates asserted that the report showed evidence of
grave violations even if, in the words of the Portuguese delegate, "the picture
of Cuba... was certainly not comparable with the human rights situations
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in some other countries where the number of killings, disappearances, and
forms of torture, raised the question of the individual State's capacity to
maintain law and order and respect for human rights."" To the United
Kingdom, the report showed that "an all-powerful and oppressive party
machine dominated all aspects of public and private life and prevented or
extinguished all dissent and all independence of thought and expression." 12
The Latin American delegates and several developing countries noted that
the human rights situation in Cuba could not be considered in isolation from
the attempts to destabilize the Cuban government; they noted the outstanding
record of Cuba on economic, social, and cultural rights. The Indian repre-
sentative said, "My country does not believe that any consideration of the
situation of human rights .. . in any society should be invoked for the
purposes of forcing changes in the socio-economic system freely adopted
by a society."13 Several countries on both sides commended the cooperation
of the government of Cuba.
Outside of the public discussion, tense negotiations continued between
representatives of the European Community, on the one hand, and the Latin
American "Group of 8," on the other.'" The principal basis of the negotiation
was a text prepared by both sides upon which agreement could be achieved
on all points except on what, if any, follow-up mechanism to give the report
on Cuba. Pursuant to the text the Commission would have thanked the
Cuban government for its cooperation and for the "reaffirmation of the desire
of the Cuban authorities to continue co-operation in the human rights sphere
and to keep the Secretary-General informed .... ,,15 The Latin American
group, however, sought a text which did not keep Cuba on the agenda of
the Commission, maintain the existence of the group, or meet any of the
other objectives of the United States. Instead, the Latin American draft es-
sentially terminated consideration by the Commission of the issue. The Eur-
opean Community negotiators sought some follow-up related to the report
on Cuba. There was an agreement in the negotiations, in any case, that
neither side would submit their proposals as resolutions or take any other
action, until all hope of consensus was exhausted.
On 3 March 1989 the US delegation violated this agreement by sub-
mitting their draft resolution to the Secretary of the Commission while the
negotiations were still in process.'" The United States later apologized, saying
11. U.N. Doc. EICN.4/1989/SR.42, at 6 (1989).
12. Id. at 8.
13. K. Sharma, Permanent Representative of India, Statement to UN Commission on Human
Rights, 28 Feb. 1989, at 2.
14. The European Community efforts were ratified by the Western European and Other Group,
including the United States. The Latin American "Group of 8" negotiated on behalf of
Cuba.
15. The text was later issued as U.N. Doc. EICN.4/1989/L.90 (1989).
16. The US resolution was submitted on behalf of Canada, the Netherlands, and the United
Kingdom as cosponsors.
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that the submission had been made by an overzealous junior member of
the delegation. The negotiations were beginning to reach an impasse, but
had not been ended. The submission of the US draft resolution on Cuba,
which was later issued as L.89,' 7 gave that draft priority in being considered
first under the Commission's rules. The Latin American resolution was sub-
mitted by Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and Peru half an hour later and was
designated as L.90.'8
The US preemptory submission of its resolution was considered such a
breach of honor among the negotiators that Michael Lillis (Ireland) and
Mercedes Rico (Spain) withdrew from the discussions and refused to continue
as negotiators; valuable days were lost in getting the negotiations restarted.
Another consequence of the US blunder was that the British and the Dutch
withdrew their cosponsorship of L.89, until the United States apologized to
the Western European and Other Group. Lillis and Rico, in turn, apologized
to the Latin American "Group of 8." By the time the resolution should have
been considered by the Commission, however, the negotiations had re-
commenced with the British, Canadian, and Dutch representatives negoti-
ating for the cosponsors of L.89-but not for the European Community or
the Western European and Other group. Negotiations proceeded with the
Commission continuing its voting on other resolutions and then periodically
adjourning the public deliberations in the hope that the negotiators would
succeed in obtaining a resolution which would achieve a consensus. A
consensus resolution would have far greater authority than a resolution
adopted by a vote. Also, delegations were reluctant to be forced to vote and
thus incur the wrath of the other side of the dispute.
Finally, at a few minutes before 11:00 p.m. on Thursday, 9 March 1989,
the negotiators entered the Commission's room and called for the Com-
mission to come into public session.' 9 Neither the chair of the Commission
nor most delegations were apparently informed as to what would happen
next. The head of the United Kingdom delegation first asked the Commission
to consider resolution L.90 (the Latin American draft) before the US resolution
in L.89 (which had by then been cosponsored in revised form by Canada,
Morocco, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom). 20 That request was
accepted by the Commission without a vote.
The Latin draft resolution in L.90 was then amended orally by its sponsors
to state that the UN Secretary-General would continue to maintain direct
contacts with the government of Cuba. The UK ambassador sought the floor
once again to introduce a proposal for an additional amendment to L.90
17. U.N. Doc. FJCN.4/1989/L.89 (1989).
18. U.N. Doc. EICN.4/1989/L.90 (1989).
19. The negotiators had evidently been informed that the interpreters had only been hired until
11:00 p.m. that night.
20. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1989/L.89/Rev.1 (1989).
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which added two concepts: first, that the Secretary-General would maintain
contact not only with the government, but also with the "people of Cuba";
and second, the Secretary-General would report to the Commission "as
appropriate." 21 The UK ambassador explained that these two elements were
the only remaining issues of dispute between the negotiators, but that no
agreement could be achieved.
The proposed UK amendment to L.90, which would have strengthened
it slightly and would have kept Cuba on the agenda of the Commission for
1990, was then put to a vote. The vote was far closer than anyone had
anticipated: seventeen in favor, seventeen against, and eight abstentions.
Thus, the proposed UK amendment failed by the narrowest of margins. (Later,
several delegates noted that the vote of Botswana against the British amend-
ment was a surprise. Other votes of interest included the abstentions of
Argentina, Brazil, Rwanda, Swaziland, and Venezuela. Colombia, Cyprus,
and Sri Lanka voted against the UK resolution.)22 The chair called for a vote
on draft resolution L.90 as amended only by the Latin cosponsors and not
by the British proposal. At that point it appeared that the UK negotiators and
the United States had not anticipated losing the vote on the British amend-
ment. The UK and the US could have saved face and agreed to accept the
remaining resolution by consensus. Such a consensus resolution would have
had considerable authority and left both sides with some ability to claim
success.
Instead, the United Kingdom and the United States let resolution L.90
go to a vote. They did not even coordinate their forces by explaining to their
allies how they would vote on L.90. The result was an embarrassing disarray.
The roll call vote began with Morocco, 23 which had cosponsored L.89 (the
US resolution) and had voted in favor of the British amendment to L.90.
They reasoned, without guidance from the United States or the United King-
dom, that L.90 would be unacceptable without the proposed British amend-
ment. So, Morocco voted against L.90. Portugal and Spain, which had also
voted for the British amendment, abstained. The United Kingdom and the
United States, wishing belatedly to save face and to join the weak resolution
on Cuba, voted in favor of L.90.24 After the United States and United Kingdom
21. E/CN.4/1989/SR.56/Add.1, at 2 (1989).
22. The following delegations voted in favor of the proposed UK amendment: Bangladesh,
Belgium, Canada, France, Gambia, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Morocco,
Philippines, Portugal, Senegal, Somalia, Sweden, Togo, United Kingdom, and United States.
The following delegations voted against the proposed UK amendment: Botswana, Bulgaria,
China, Colombia, Cuba, Cyprus, Ethiopia, German Democratic Republic, India, Iraq, Mex-
ico, Panama, Peru, Sri Lanka, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, and Yugoslavia. Abstaining were:
Argentina, Brazil, Nigeria, Pakistan, Rwanda, Spain, Swaziland, and Venezuela. Sao Tome
and Principe did not participate in the vote.
23. Votes at the Commission begin with a country chosen at random by the Secretary. In this
case, the secretary chose Morocco.
24. The UK vote in favor of the resolution was greeted by audible laughter in the room.
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indicated their position, most of the other Western countries voted in favor
of their solution. In the end, L.90 was adopted by a vote of thirty-two in
favor, one (Morocco) against, and ten abstaining. Then the UK head of
delegation stated that he wished to seek a vote on the US resolution in L.89.
In view of the failure to obtain a majority even on the very modest British
amendment to L.90, it was very difficult to understand why the UK head of
delegation would pursue a vote on the far more ambitious resolution in L.89.
The draft resolution in L.89 would continue the existence of the group which
had visited Cuba, continue its monitoring of the human rights situation in
Cuba, encourage a second visit, and would call for a discussion of Cuba
under agenda item 12. It was even harder to understand why the US del-
egation, which was sitting right next to the UK delegation, did not suggest
that L.89 be withdrawn. Instead, the vote was taken and the draft resolution
in L.89 lost badly on a procedural motion by the Cuban delegation to take
no action: sixteen in favor of taking no action; seven against the motion;
and nineteen abstaining. The US-UK position was not even supported by
Belgium, France, Italy, Japan, Portugal, or Sweden, which had generally
supported the US-UK efforts up to that point.25 Several of those delegates
and even such countries as Bangladesh and Gambia (which had voted with
the United States on every issue) complained after the session that they had
been told that L.89 would never be brought to a vote; that they had not
been advised adequately of the tactics to be followed; and that they could
not understand why L.89 had been brought to a vote. Neither the US nor
the UK delegates could explain why they pursued a series of votes which
demonstrated deepening disarray and ultimately made the US position look
like an abjectfailure, when in fact, the Commission was quite evenly divided
on the critical vote.
El Salvador
The special representative on El Salvador, Pastor Ridruejo of Spain, reported
that the situation of human rights in that country had seriously deteriorated.
In particular, he noted, "An alarming number of politically motivated sum-
mary executions, including mass executions, have been carried out by mem-
bers of the State apparatus, particularly members of the armed forces ... "
25. It may have been that the United Kingdom and the United States expected the Western
European and Other (WEO) group to unite in opposing the Cuban motion because the
WEO group had established a firm position of principle to oppose no-action motions under
Commission rule 65(2) which may prevent the Commission from considering human rights
situations on their merits. The Cuban motion, however, was introduced under Commission
rule 65(I) that permits the Commission to avoid a second vote on a subject once a resolution
has been adopted on the same issue. The WEO group had themselves used rule 65(2)
motions in other circumstances and had no fixed view opposing such motions.
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and that this number had increased over that of recent years.26 Nevertheless,
the resolution on El Salvador, written by Colombia, Mexico, and Peru but
negotiated with the government of El Salvador, was considerably weaker
than in previous years, failing to mention, for instance, the "death squads"
who, according to the special representative, had "increased their criminal
activities" 27 in the past year.
Guatemala
Hector Gros Espiell (Uruguay), the expert appointed in 1987 under the
Advisory Services program, pointed in his report to serious human rights
violations in Guatemala. Once again, however, he seemed to treat the gov-
ernment as a victim of circumstance: "these [violations] are the outcome
not of government orders or policy but of factors, of acts committed by power
circles and a persistent climate of violence that are still beyond effective
government control .... -"28 He thus failed to identify the major cause of the
continuing violations, that is, the government's "dirty war" counter-insur-
gency policy which is in the hands of the military and not the civilian
authorities. Guatemalan opposition groups pointed out that the expert's
evaluation of the situation was more positive than those of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, independent human rights monitors, and the
Commission's own reports on disappearances and executions.
Several Commission participants, including the Swedish delegation, still
believe that the decision in 1987 to remove Guatemala from agenda item
twelve (violations) and place it under agenda item twenty-two (advisory
services) was "premature." The weak Commission resolution in 1989 "rec-
ognized," however, the government's commitment to human rights while
expressing the Commission's concern "at the harmful conditions that still
exist." 29
Haiti
The excellent report by the expert appointed under the Advisory Services
program, Philippe Texier of France, concluded that under the new govern-
ment of General Prosper Avril, "the political will to take specific measures
aimed at ensuring everyday observance of [human] rights has not so far been
26. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1989/23, at 26 (1989).
27. Id.
28. U.N. Doc. EICN.4/1989/39, at 19 (1989).
29. C.H.R. Res. 1989/74, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1989/L.11/Add.8, at 38, 39 (1989).
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convincingly demonstrated. ... 3o Consequently, he wondered "whether
minimum standards of respect for international norms should not be required
in order for a country to benefit from United Nations advisory services," 31
and asked the Commission to consider the possibility of appointing a Special
Rapporteur. If Advisory Services were to be continued, he recommended
that the program's focus should be on organizing elections and promoting
an independent judiciary, and that local human rights groups be associated
with the program. The French delegation promoted and the Commission
adopted a resolution to continue the mandate of the expert, adopting his
suggestions and also requesting him "to provide information ...on the
development of the human rights situation in Haiti." 32
Iran
In addition to the Report of the Special Rapporteur on Executions (see infra
at note 41), the Commission had before it the report of Special Rapporteur
Galindo Pohl (El Salvador) and a memorandum of Amnesty International
recording over 1,000 names of political prisoners reportedly killed in a "wave
of executions of political prisoners." 33 Since July 1988, Mr. Pohl, who is still
denied access to the country, recorded reliable reports of arbitrary arrests,
ill-treatment of political prisoners, torture, and unfair trials. A Western-spon-
sored resolution, which was adopted twenty in favor, six against, with twelve
abstentions, urged Iran to grant access to the special rapporteur and expressed
deep concern over the wave of executions as well as the numerous and
detailed allegations of other human rights violations.
As has been the practice for the last couple of years, no delegation
introduced the resolution against Iran because of concern that that govern-
ment or its citizens might be singled out for retaliation. The vote against Iran
was much stronger than at the Commission in 1988 or in the General
Assembly in 1988, apparently because of the death threats against Salman
Rushdie. While at the General Assembly, there had been efforts to negotiate
with the Iranian government for a moderate resolution in exchange for
assurances by Iran of cooperation with the special rapporteur. The Rushdie
affair ended, at least for the 1989 session, any efforts at negotiation with the
Iranian delegation.
Iraq
The Commission's most dismal failure was its refusal to take action on Iraq
which, according to Amnesty International, "clearly and incontrovertibly
30. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1989/40, at 20 (1989).
31. Id. at 22.
32. C.H.R. Res. 1989/73, U.N. Doc. ECN.4/1989/L.1 l/Add.8, at 35, 37 (1989).
33. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1989/26, at 8 (1989).
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presents a situation of the most flagrant and massive violations of human
rights." 34 With the Special Rapporteur on Executions recording thousands
of alleged deaths by chemical weapons and mass executions and the Working
Group on Disappearances listing over 2,600 unresolved cases and reports
of routine torture even against the children of political opponents, both the
International Commission of Jurists and Amnesty International said in their
oral interventions that the "credibility of the Commission" depended on its
taking action against Iraq.35 After consideration of Iraq was discontinued
under the confidential 1503 procedure, the twelve European Community
countries (minus France), Australia, Canada, and Sweden tabled a resolution
to appoint a Special Rapporteur. Only Japan, Peru, and Togo joined the
Western countries in opposing a motion by Iraq (17-13-9) to take no action
on the draft. The successful plurality included the six Moslem and Arab
countries as well as Botswana, Brazil (a principal source of arms to Iraq),
China (which also sells missiles to Iraq), Cuba, Cyprus, Ethiopia, India, the
Philippines, Sao Tome, Sri Lanka, and Yugoslavia.
Israeli-Occupied Territories
The Commission reaffirmed the inalienable right of the Palestinian people
to self-determination and the establishment of an independent sovereign
state on their national soil, welcomed the declaration of the state of Palestine,
and considered the decisions of the Palestine National Council of 15 No-
vember 1988 a prerequisite for the establishment of a just and lasting peace
in the Middle East.
Southern Lebanon
The Commission, by thirty in favor, one (United States) against, and twelve
(mostly Western European countries) abstaining, strongly condemned Israel
for its continued violations of human rights in southern Lebanon and called
upon Israel to put an immediate end to such practices, to liberate Lebanese
prisoners, to return all those expelled to their homes, to stop expelling
Palestinians arbitrarily to southern Lebanon, and to implementthe resolutions
of the Security Council which require the immediate, and unconditional
withdrawal of Israel from all Lebanese territory.
34. Amnesty International, Evasion of Government Accountability 3 (oral intervention before
UN Comm'n on Human Rights, Mar. 1989).
35. Id.
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Romania
For the first time in five years, the Commission on Human Rights in 1989
recommended to the Economic and Social Council that a new Special Rap-
porteur be appointed on a country situation. The human rights situation has
been deteriorating in Romania. At the 1989 session, the proposed rural
"systematization," the treatment of the Hungarian and German minorities,
and the declining enjoyment of economic, social, and cultural rights were
the subject of numerous governmental and NGO interventions. A Swedish
resolution to appoint a Special Rapporteur to study the human rights situation
in Romania received an enormous boost when the deputy foreign minister
of Hungary came to the Commission to announce his country's cosponsor-
ship for the measure. This gesture prevented the issue from becoming an
East-West matter and made passage of the resolution likely. Two days before
the vote, and reportedly at the insistence of the Soviet Union, Romania
informally offered to invite the Commission's Bureau to visit Romania. When
the cosponsors of the resolution insisted that the offer be made in writing
and contain at least the guarantees provided to the mission which visited
Cuba, however, the Romanians withdrew their offer. With the countries of
Eastern Europe not participating in the vote, the Swedish resolution passed
easily, twenty-one in favor, seven against, and ten abstentions. The Romanian
delegate responded that his country considered the vote "null and void"
and made it understood that the Special Rapporteur was not likely to be
permitted into his country.36
The Commission also adopted a resolution by a vote of twenty-six in
favor, five against, and twelve abstentions, calling for an advisory opinion
by the International Court of Justice about applicability of the UN Convention
on Privileges and Immunities to the detention by the Romanian government
of a Romanian citizen, Dumitru Mazilu, who had been prevented from
completing his work as an expert on youth matters for the UN Sub-Com-
mission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities.
South Africa (and Namibia)
The Commission heard the report of the "Group of Three" 37 created within
the framework of the International Convention on the Suppression and Pun-
ishment of the Crime of Apartheid and the report of the ad hoc Working
Group of Experts on South Africa. This latter report is essentially based on
36. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1989/SR.56, at 5 (1989).
37. U.N. Docs. E/CN.4/1989/31 & 33 (1988) (The members of the Group of Three were from
Ethiopia, the German Democratic Republic, and Mexico.).
Vol. I1I
1989 Session of the UN Commission on Human Rights
first hand information which the experts collected, in cooperation with the
Special Rapporteur on Summary and Arbitrary Executions, in Europe and in
front-line states. For twenty years, access to South Africa has been continually
refused to the ad hoc Working Group. The Commission again adopted
resolutions demanding that South Africa abolish the system of apartheid in
all its forms, reaffirming the inalienable right of the people of South Africa
and Namibia to self-determination and independence, and condemning the
continuing collaboration of certain Western states which obstruct efforts to
eliminate apartheid. The Commission called once again upon all govern-
ments to take measures at a national level with a view to putting a stop to
their commercial activities in the territory of South Africa as well as of
Namibia.
THE ECOSOC RESOLUTION 1503 PROCEDURE
Under the confidential procedure established pursuant to ECOSOC reso-
lution 1503, the Commission continued consideration of the cases of Brunei,
Haiti, Paraguay, and Somalia while discontinuing consideration of Honduras,
Iraq, Syria, and Zaire (though Zaire will apparently be discussed in a special
closed session next year). The viability of this procedure is increasingly being
questioned. First, it is unclear what positive effect "confidential" actions
have (particularly when compared with the public resolutions which were
not an alternative when 1503 was instituted). Second, delegations appear
even less likely to criticize their counterparts in confidential voting than
when those votes are publicly recorded. Hence, while the confidential voting
on Iraq was reported to be t v'enty-four in favor, twelve against, and seven
abstentions in that government's favor, the no-action motion on the public
resolution was passed by only seventeen in favor, thirteen against, and nine
abstentions.38
THEME PROCEDURES
Since 1980 the UN Commission on Human Rights has been slowly devel-
oping an approach to human rights violations which focuses on the kind of
abuse and not solely on countries where serious problems arise. Accordingly,
the Commission established the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary
Disappearances in 1980, the Special Rapporteur on Summary or Arbitrary
Executions in 1982, the Special Rapporteur on Torture in 1985, and the
38. Part of this change may have been due to increased lobbying which occurred after the
initial 1503 vote and before the public vote on Iraq.
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Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance in 1986. Each of these mecha-
nisms has the authority to receive information on human rights problems
within its area of concern and to take "effective action" in trying to urge
governments to resolve the problems. In 1987 the Commission also estab-
lished a Special Rapporteur on Mercenaries, who is authorized to visit coun-
tries where mercenaries have committed abuses, but who has not yet been
given authority to take "effective action." Nevertheless, in 1988 the Com-
mission characterized the Special Rapporteur on Mercenaries as a theme
procedure and extended its mandate for two years at the same time as it
extended the mandate of other theme mechanisms. Together, the theme
procedures do the most important concrete work of the Commission in
protecting human rights in specific cases by saving lives, stopping torture,
resolving disappearances, etc. Nevertheless, the theme procedures are still
evolving and being improved.
The decision of the Commission in 1988 to extend the mandate of all
the theme procedures for two years constituted a significant step in solidifying
support for and giving a measure of independence to the Working Group
on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances as well as the theme rapporteurs.
The 1988 decision meant that none of the theme procedures needed to be
extended at the 1989 Commission session. Nevertheless, the USSR dele-
gation proposed a resolution which expressed appreciation to the special
rapporteurs and other monitoring mechanisms of the Commission for their
contribution in implementing universally recognized standards of human
rights. The initial USSR proposal was for a study of how the various thematic
and country rapporteurs do their work. The Western European delegates
were concerned that such a study might lead to limitations on the work of
the rapporteurs. It is precisely the individual initiative and independence of
the rapporteurs which make them effective in protecting human rights. Also,
their procedures are still evolving and there was concern that any study
might eventually lead to the rapporteurs being given only the lowest common
denominator of authority without the capacity of creativity in pursuing their
quite distinct mandates. After some negotiation, the initial Soviet proposal
for a study was modified to request the UN Secretary-General to consider
also convening a meeting of the Commission special rapporteurs, the chair
of the Commission, the chair of the Sub-Commission, and the five rapporteurs
representing the Sub-Commission. The resolution, which was introduced by
an Austrian representative to the Commission, was adopted by consensus.
While the Commission generally expressed satisfaction with the work
of the present theme rapporteurs, the British delegation was unable to con-
vince the Commission to establish a new special rapporteur to examine the
question of persons deprived of their liberty for seeking to exercise peacefully
their rights to freedom of expression, association, and assembly. The proposal
was blocked by India and several other third world delegations. In the end,
the British delegation had to settle for a resolution, similar to last year's,
calling on governments to release political prisoners.
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In a salient 1988 intervention, Amnesty International suggested that the
theme mechanisms provide an objective vehicle by which the Commission
can identify situations of serious human rights violations and find ways of
according them particular attention. It often seems, however, as if the Com-
mission lacks the political will to respond appropriately to the information
provided by the rapporteurs. Hence, despite clear signs from the Special
Rapporteur on Summary or Arbitrary Executions and the Working Group on
Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances concerning the gravity of the sit-
uation in Iraq, the Commission failed to act. Similarly, although the Working
Group on Disappearances reported after visiting Colombia that in most cases
"circumstantial evidence strongly suggests or precise information clearly
demonstrates involvement of units of the armed forces or security services
in enforced or involuntary disappearances," 39 no resolution on that country
was even introduced. Indeed, the resolution on the Working Group, which
is ordinarily introduced by the French delegation to the Commission, did
not even refer to the group's visit to Colombia.
WORKING GROUP ON ENFORCED OR INVOLUNTARY
DISAPPEARANCES
In its best report yet, the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Dis-
appearances reported transmitting 392 cases alleged to have taken place in
1988 in fifteen countries. The largest number of outstanding cases are found
in Argentina (3,387, all from before 1983), Guatemala (2,851), Iraq (2,728),
and El Salvador (2,141). The group expressed its "concern over the total
lack of cooperation from . . . Governments which have never provided
substantive replies to the allegations transmitted to them, such as Afghanistan,
Angola, Chile, Guinea, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Nepal and Seychelles."40
It announced that at its first 1989 session it would examine the various
initiatives aimed at preparation of international declarations or conventions
on the subject. The group again noted the inadequacy of the institutional
and legal framework in most affected countries, in particular limitations on
habeas corpus.
The Working Group emphasized the importance of the judgment of the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights finding Honduras liable for
disappearances 41 as "a precedent for the investigation and judgement of an
enforced disappearance by a supranational judicial organ." 42 It highlighted
two aspects of the Court's holding which supported Working Group practice:
39. U.N. Doc. EICN.4/1989/18/Add.1, at 33 (1989).
40. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1989/18, at 85 (1989).
41. Angel Manfredo Velasquez Rodriquez v. Honduras, Inter-American Court of Human Rights,
19 Jul. 1988.
42. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1989/18, at 6 (1989).
1989
HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY
(1) responsibility for violations of human rights continues irrespective of
changes in government and (2) states are obliged to investigate disappear-
ances as long as uncertainty remains, with no time limit. The Dutch dele-
gation (whose member, Toine van Dongen is also on the Working Group)
would later emphasize these points to "put to rest" the argument of "some
governments" (i.e., Argentina) that they cannot be held responsible for dis-
appearances dating back to earlier administrations. Portugal also stressed
these points.
The group drew the attention of the governments of El Salvador, Iran,
Iraq, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka to the recommendation of the General
Assembly and the Commission that governments concerned with disap-
pearances consider inviting the Working Group to visit their country.
SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON TORTURE
In his fourth annual report, the Special Rapporteur on Torture, Professor Peter
Kooijmans (Netherlands) concluded that "torture is still rampant in various
parts of the world," 43 most often accompanying civil strife and civil war.
During the year, he accepted invitations for consultative visits to South Korea,
Peru, and Turkey and in each case made evaluations and recommendations
which are included in his report. During the year he transmitted allegations
to thirty-seven countries for clarification and sent forty-two urgent appeals
for immediate government attention. Some twenty states did not reply in
any form. All in all, the fourth report was a considerable improvement over
the third report in providing more detail about the information received by
the Special Rapporteur and what he did in response.
Among his recommendations, the Special Rapporteur suggested that a
legal provision prescribing that a person be given access to a lawyer not
later than twenty-four hours after his arrest usually constitutes an effective
protection against torture, so long as governments actually comply with such
a provision. He also recommended that the right of habeas corpus should
be strictly respected and never suspended.
SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON SUMMARY OR ARBITRARY EXECUTIONS
In his seventh report to the Commission, the Special Rapporteur on Summary
or Arbitrary Executions, Amos Wako (Kenya), reported addressing urgent
cables to twenty-three governments (of whom only eight responded) and
43. U.N. Doc. FCN.4/1989/1 5, at 15 (1989).
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letters concerning alleged executions to thirty-six governments (of whom
only fifteen responded).
Mr. Wako's report provided detailed summaries of the situations giving
rise to his concerns. Among the country situations, the special rapporteur
referred to "persistent reports received that several thousand persons had
been executed without trial or with a trial of a summary nature" 4 in Iran
and reports that several thousand civilians were killed in a series of attacks
using chemical weapons in Iraq. In this respect, he concluded that "in some
areas where peace negotiations have ended international armed conflicts,
reports are emerging which indicate that the governmental instruments of
power have turned from the enemy across the border to civilians within the
country, with the result that there has been a very noticeable increase in
summary or arbitrary executions by the governments concerned of their own
civilians."4 -
The rapporteur also noted with concern increased reports of the use of
chemical weapons as well as increased allegations of killings by law en-
forcement officials during demonstrations.
The special rapporteur suggested that the effective implementation of
his mandate would be enhanced through more on-site visits and through
the creation of a team of forensic medical experts to accompany and assist
him on the visits.
SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE
The Commission received the report of its special rapporteur on religious
intolerance, Angelo Vidal D'Almeida Ribeiro (Portugal), whose report fol-
lowed the same approach as the other rapporteurs. The Commission has
been considering for several years the possibility of drafting a Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based
on Religion or Belief. Many delegates who recall the twenty years it took
to draft a declaration on this subject are uncertain whether the expense and
effort to draft a treaty would be worthwhile, and similarly wonder whether
a treaty would actually improve relevant standards. Others want to follow
the normal progression in standard-setting from a declaration to a convention.
At its 1989 session the Commission once again temporized on their decision
as to this controversial issue.
SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON MERCENARIES
In the second year of his mandate, the special rapporteur on mercenaries,
Enrique Bernales Ballesteros of Peru, responded to invitations from Angola
44. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1989/25, at 28 (1989).
45. Id. at 62.
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and Nicaragua to examine reports of mercenary aggression against those
countries. The report on his mission to Angola was presented to the General
Assembly while a report covering his visit to Nicaragua was prepared for
the Commission. The report analyzes the US-sponsored "contra" war against
Nicaragua in light of the judgment of the International Court of Justice holding
that the aggression violates customary international law. After finding (as
had the World Court) that numerous non-Nicaraguans, including US citizens,
Cuban-Americans, and others, were involved in mercenary acts against Nic-
aragua, the special rapporteur turned carefully to the Nicaraguan govern-
ment's categorization of all the Contras, including Nicaraguan citizens, as
mercenaries. He noted that, in accordance with Additional Protocol I of the
Geneva Conventions, one of the prerequisites for mercenary status is that
the person concerned should be a foreigner. Nevertheless, he stated that it
would be "in the interests of the international community that it should
consider from a legal standpoint the situation by which nationals of a country
are recruited, armed, financed, equipped and used by a third country for
aggression against their own country, on an individual basis or as part of a
group serving the interests of the country that recruits and employs them
directly or indirectly."4 6
CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD
Since 1981, an open-ended Working Group has met prior to the Commis-
sion's session to draft a Convention on the Rights of the Child. The Working
Group held its session from 28 November to 8 December 1988 and adopted
the text of the draft Convention on second reading for transmission to the
Commission; accordingly, the Commission had before it both the text of the
draft Convention and the report of the Working Group.
The question of military recruitment of youths had been a difficult one
for the Working Group. The problem was to avoid falling below existing
standards of humanitarian law, on the one hand, while trying to adopt a text
by consensus, on the other. During the Commission debate, some delegations
expressed concern that the present draft does not ban recruitment under
eighteen, but only provides that "States Parties shall take all feasible measures
to ensure that persons who have not attained the age of 15 years do not
take a direct part in hostilities,"47 thus failing to extend to children the level
of protection equal to that recognized in Protocol II of the 1977 Geneva
Convention. Other delegations lamented that the right of the child to choose
46. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1989/14, at 44-45 (1989).
47. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1989/29, at 16 (1989) (Draft Convention on the Rights of the Child, art.
38(2)).
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his or her own religion was removed from the draft text. Some delegations
from North Africa warned that this Convention may have negative effects,
because it does not take enough consideration of the family.
The expression of these concerns did not prevent the Commission from
deciding without a vote to adopt the draft Convention and to transmit it, as
well as the report of the Working Group, to the General Assembly-through
the ECOSOC-for consideration, with a view to the adoption of the Con-
vention by the Assembly at its forty-fourth session in 1989. NGOs concerned
with children's rights hope that, in the meantime, efforts will be made to
ensure a more satisfactory text.
SUB-COMMISSION ON PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND
PROTECTION OF MINORITIES
While in past sessions the Commission on Human Rights had expressed
dissatisfaction with the work of its Sub-Commission on Prevention of Dis-
crimination and Protection of Minorities, the debate at the 1989 session of
the Commission reflected the success of the August-September 1988 session
of the Sub-Commission. The Sub-Commission produced new initiatives on
the death penalty, mental patients, computerized personal files, the inde-
pendence of judges and lawyers, and the rights of indigenous peoples. The
Soviet delegation pointed out that thirty-five of the forty resolutions adopted
by the Sub-Commission were accepted by consensus. Few interventions,
however, failed to raise the question of the Romanian expert Dumitru Mazilu,
who is apparently being prevented by his government from coming to Ge-
neva. Many also believe that the Sub-Commission devotes too much time
to issues already being considered by the Commission and other UN organs.
A joint NGO intervention welcomed the success of the Sub-Commission
and suggested that even more could be achieved through the increased use
of working groups at the Sub-Commission. The intervention also warned
that the question of independence goes deeper than the Mazilu case, pointing
out that nine Sub-Commission experts were government foreign service
officers subject to intense pressure, particularly when voting on country
situations. This sentiment was strongly echoed by the delegates from Ireland
and the Netherlands.
In other actions relating to the Sub-Commission, the Commission:
-recommended that the General Assembly consider the adoption and
publication of the "guidelines on the use of computerized personal
files" 48 prepared by the Sub-Commission expert Louis Joinet (France),
48. C.H.R. Res. 1989/43, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1989/L.1 1/Add. 6, at 57 (1989).
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-recommended to ECOSOC that it authorize an open-ended Working
Group to meet for two weeks before the Commission's next session to
"examine, revise and simplify as necessary" 49 the draft body of principles
and guarantees received from the Sub-Commission for the protection of
persons detained on grounds of mental ill-health or suffering from mental
disorder,
-referred the Sub-Commission's draft declaration on the independence
of judges and lawyers to the UN Crime Branch where the Basic Principles
on the Independence of the Judiciary were drafted and where Basic
Principles on the Role of Lawyers are being prepared,
-confirmed the appointment of Miguel Alfonso Martinez (Cuba) as
special rapporteur of the Sub-Commission to carry out a study on treaties
between indigenous peoples and governments.
SECOND OPTIONAL PROTOCOL ON THE DEATH PENALTY
One of the most impressive successes of the Sub-Commission was the Com-
mission's prompt acceptance of the Sub-Commission's draft Second Optional
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights for the
abolition of the death penalty. The 1989 Commission recommended to the
General Assembly, through ECOSOC, the adoption of the Second Optional
Protocol. Although a number of the Commission members still maintain the
death penalty, they were apparently convinced that the Optional Protocol
would, indeed, be optional. That is, the governments that no longer have
the death penalty, such as Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany,
Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, wanted the Optional Protocol, so
as to reaffirm internationally their decision to abolish capital punishment.
Governments which still have the death penalty did not block the adoption
by consensus of the resolution recommending the Second Optional Protocol.
The success of the draft Second Optional Protocol was due in part to respect
for Marc Bossuyt, chair of the 1989 Commission, who had drafted the Second
Optional Protocol when he was previously a member of the Sub-Commis-
sion.
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION TO MILITARY SERVICE
In 1987 the Commission on Human Rights adopted, by a vote of twenty-
six in favor, two (Iraq and Mozambique) against, and fourteen abstaining, a
resolution which contained language garbled by negotiations apparently
recognizing conscientious objection to military service as a human right. At
49. C.H.R. Res. 1989/40, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1989/L.11, Add.6, at 54 (1989).
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its 1989 session the Commission reaffirmed by consensus in much clearer
language "the right of everyone to have conscientious objections to military
service as a legitimate exercise of the right of freedom of thought, conscience
and religion." 0 The 1989 resolution on conscientious objection was co-
sponsored for the first time by Hungary, but after the adoption of the res-
olution several countries (China, Cuba, Ethiopia, Mexico, the USSR, and
Yugoslavia) expressed reservations which would have led them to have
abstained if there had been a vote, and Iraq said they would have voted
against the resolution. Nevertheless, none of their reservations were so strong
as to require them to block the Commission's consensus.
ADVISORY SERVICES
The Commission on Human Rights, in a resolution adopted by consensus,
commended the progress which has been made by the Centre for Human
Rights in providing practical assistance to governments in fulfilling their
human rights obligations by developing human rights institutions, giving
training courses, drafting legal texts in conformity with international stan-
dards, coordinating national technical assistance programs, asking other UN
bodies to recommend advisory services to achieve the rights within their
particular domain, and pursuing other specific projects. The Commission
also encouraged more contributions to the UN Voluntary Fund for Advisory
Services and Technical Assistance in the Field of Human Rights to make
these projects possible.
Nevertheless, the blossoming advisory services program was subjected
to criticism by Western governments and a coalition of NGOs for not using
concrete criteria in the determination of programs and countries on which
to focus. Several speakers also warned that the advisory services program
should not be used to replace or undermine the reporting, monitoring, and
investigating activities of the Commission.
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS
Once again, the debate on economic, social, and cultural rights was marked
by a strong difference of views between the developing and socialist coun-
tries, on the one hand, and the Western states on the other. The Commission
heard the report of the Working Group of Governmental Experts on the Right
50. C.H.R. Res. 1989/59, U.N. Doc. EICN.4/1989/L.11/Add.8, at 5 (1989); see Weissbrodt,
The United Nations Commission on Human Rights Confirms Conscientious Objection to
Military Service as a Human Right, 35 Netherlands International Law Review 53, 65-66
(1 Nov. 1988).
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to Development which recommended that the coordination of activities of
UN organs concerning development should be reinforced; that a global
consultation on the realization of the right to development should be or-
ganized; and that means of evaluation should be established to measure the
progress achieved in the reinforcement and implementation of the Decla-
ration on the Right to Development.
Resolutions were adopted without a vote on the right to development,
human rights and extreme poverty, and non-discrimination in the field of
health; other resolutions, such as the one on the realization of economic,
social, and cultural rights, were adopted over the opposition of the Western
countries (except for the abstention of Portugal).
Over stiff Western opposition, the Commission approved (30-6-6) a Latin
American proposal to include, as a specific point on its agenda next year,
economic adjustment policies, the debt burden and its effects on the full
enjoyment of human rights and, in particular, on the implementation of the
Declaration on the Right to Development. According to Peruvian diplomat
Manuel Rodriguez, "until now, the Commission has only studied violations
of civil and political rights on the part of underdeveloped countries. Now
we will be able to study the role of the industrialized countries in economic
adjustment policies which prevent the fulfillment of these rights."5'
OTHER ISSUES
The Commission also adopted resolutions on administrative detention with-
out charge or trial; detention of UN personnel; a framework for future efforts
on periodic and genuine elections; hostage-taking; independence of the
judiciary, jurors, and assessors and the independence of lawyers; the right
of everyone to leave their country and return; human rights and mass ex-
oduses; migrant workers; continuation of the drafting of a declaration on
the rights of minorities; continuation of the drafting of a declaration on the
rights of human rights defenders; national institutions for the protection of
human rights; a renewed call for contributions to the Voluntary Fund for
Victims of Torture; and the mounting of a World Public Information Cam-
paign for Human Rights.
CONCLUSION
The 45th session of the UN Commission on Human Rights took a number
of incremental steps towards improving the protection of human rights
51. This statement was made to media representatives and other observers at the Commission,
but not in the official debate. Cf. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1989/SR.47, at 4 (1989).
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throughoutthe world. The session was marked by a relatively slow beginning
as a larger number of delegates than usual-particularly in the influential
Western European group-were attending their first Commission. The delays
at the beginning resulted in many late-night meetings at the end of the six-
week session. Nevertheless, by the end the Commission was able to make
most of its decisions by consensus.
A new factor in the examination of country situations was the decision
of Bulgaria, the German Democratic Republic, the Ukrainian SSR, and the
USSR not to participate in voting on resolutions concerning Albania, Iraq,
Iran, and Romania-giving those resolutions a greater chance of passage.
Except for the issue of Cuba, the Commission was marked by a slight decrease
in ideological polarization as compared with previous sessions. Even reso-
lutions on Albania, Burma, and Romania were not generally perceived in
ideological terms. This decrease in ideological polarization did not, however,
result in a much needed resolution on the grave human rights abuses in
Iraq. As to Cuba, the United States caused the Commission to devote a
considerable amount of its time and resources to the human rights situation
in that country.
Another new factor was the increased coordination of nongovernmental
organizations in making joint statements and otherwise beginning to find
ways to improve their contributions to the Commission.
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